Th is paper examines the exchange rate regimes of East Asian countries since the initial shift by China to a controlled appreciation in July 2005, testing econometrically the weights of key currencies in the implicit baskets that appear to be targeted by East Asian monetary authorities. It fi nds, fi rst, that Malaysia, Th ailand, Singapore and the Philippines have formed a loose but eff ective "renminbi bloc" with China, and that South Korea has participated tentatively since the global fi nancial crisis. Second, the emergence of the renminbi bloc in terms of the exchange rate has been facilitated by the continued dominance of the US dollar as a trade, investment, and reserve currency. Th ird, exchange rate stabilization is explained by the economic strategies of these countries, which rely heavily on export development and fi nancial repression, and the economic rise of China. Fourth, analysts should specify the exchange rate preferences of these emerging market countries carefully before drawing inferences about Chinese infl uence within the region.
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Th is paper examines the determinants of the national exchange rate regimes in these states with two purposes in mind, one explanatory and the other conceptual. With respect to the explanatory purpose, it seeks to explain the choice of several Southeast Asian countries to shadow the renminbi and that of others to fl oat. What in particular is the importance of power relative to preferences in confi guring the policies of these governments? Th e rapid growth of China and its role as a competitor for both trade and foreign direct investment loom large, but these factors should be conceptualized with care. Th e fact that some degree of regional stability is being achieved by stabilizing against the dollar also presents a puzzle.
Th e following section examines the currency policies of the 13 members of the ASEAN+3 (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus China, Japan, and South Korea) group plus Hong Kong and Taiwan over the course of the last decade and the pattern of exchange rate movements over that period.
It conducts an econometric test of the weights of the key currencies (US dollar, Japanese yen, euro, and Chinese renminbi) in the baskets to which Southeast Asian countries softly peg. Th is section argues that the renminbi has become more important than the US dollar as a reference and anchor for the exchange rate policies of these countries-a notable shift over the course of the last decade.
Th e third section discusses the role that power and agency play in the choice of these exchange rate regimes. Th e discourse among scholars emphasizes the historical dominance of the dollar, the bypassing of the Japanese yen, the rise of China, and the potential for future regional dominance of the renminbi. Th e international role of the US currency has constrained Asian countries to invoice in the 1. Additional contributions to the growing literature on Asian exchange rates include Chung and Eichengreen 2009; Eichengreen 2004 and Goldstein and Lardy 2005; Hamada, Reszat, and Volz 2009; He 2011; Henning and Khan 2011; Katada 2004 and Kawai and Takagi 2005; Kawai 2007; Ogawa and Ito 2002; Ogawa 2007; Park and Song 2011; Pauly 2011; Volz 2009; Willett, Oh, and Yoon 2004; Willett et al. 2011; and Williamson 2005. dollar, purchase dollar assets, and shadow the dollar in exchange rate policy-as one of the prominent narratives goes-with the consequence that the Federal Reserve's policy of quantitative easing disrupts monetary conditions in Asia. Reviving the Triffi n dilemma, some Asian analysts note that the needs of the international monetary system are likely to come in confl ict with the national interest of the issuer of the dominant international currency. On this reasoning, Chinese authorities have advocated exploration of a dramatic expansion of the use of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (Zhou 2009 ) and sought to expand the international role of the renminbi (Cohen forthcoming) . Th is narrative is infused with allusions to currency power and this subject might, at fi rst glance, seem to be a natural candidate for the application of "structural" concepts of power. But, as I have argued with Katada (Henning and Katada forthcoming), domestic political economy has been fundamental in explaining the exchange rate policy choices of China and its regional neighbors.
Th e fourth section of the paper examines the opposite proposition that Chinese (not US) structural power explains the exchange rate regime choices of Southeast Asian states. While the growth of the Chinese economy is indeed important to explaining the currency choices of its regional neighbors, this section argues, other conceptualizations capture these eff ects better than structural or second-face concepts of power.
Th e fi fth section draws lessons from the review of national exchange rate regimes for the defi nition, operationalization, and usefulness of alternative conceptions of power. Power as resources, structural power, and soft power vie for the aff ections of power analysts. Th e section probes the usefulness of these alternative conceptions, particularly their ability to provide a pathway to testable causal claims about power relative to alternative explanatory factors. It stresses (1) the importance of pinning down preferences of states before attempting to examine whether they are advanced or compromised by infl uence attempts, and (2) the collateral damage to positive analysis of soft power concepts. Th e fi nal section summarizes the main conclusions.
SECTION TWO: SHIFTING EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN EAST ASIA
Analysis of the exchange rate policies of East Asian countries begins with a clear description of them; unfortunately, that is not a simple matter. First, we cannot take the declarations of countries about their national currency regimes at face value; those policies are largely opaque and sometimes misrepresented. Second, there is substantial variation in the national regimes across countries and over time. Nonetheless, a pattern emerges from the exchange rate data over the last decade: Southeast Asian monetary authorities have largely shadowed the renminbi as the Chinese currency has fl oated upward against the dollar. Th is pattern can be identifi ed in two ways: (1) the cumulative movement in exchange rate levels since July 2005;
(2) econometric estimates of the weights attached to the implicit currency baskets of these authorities.
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Cumulative Movements
During the decade prior to July 2005, the renminbi was more or less fi xed to the US dollar. During that period, Southeast Asian currencies fi xed or fl oated against the dollar and renminbi similarly. When China began its controlled upward fl oat against the dollar in mid-2005, Southeast Asian countries confronted a choice between pegging softly to the dollar or to the renminbi, or to some basket in which they both had signifi cant weights. Th e governments of the larger emerging market countries in Southeast Asia generally chose to follow the renminbi-more loosely during the fi rst period of managed fl oating until July 2009, then more tightly during the second controlled fl oat after June 2010. Since mid-2005, the nominal value of the renminbi has risen about 32 percent against the dollar. Th e Indonesia rupiah and New Taiwan dollar, by contrast, have moved less than 10 percent against the US dollar, to which the Hong Kong dollar is fi xed. Although changes in the rupiah now seem to match changes in the currencies of Indonesia's neighbors, the fi gures show that Southeast Asian currencies have separated into two groups, one associated with the US dollar, the other with the renminbi. Th e Malaysian ringgit, Philippine peso, and Indonesian rupiah have followed it somewhat more loosely, but still within 10 percent and far more closely than they have the US dollar. Th e Hong Kong and New Taiwan dollars have followed diff erent paths. Overall, nonetheless, the pattern of real exchange rates also suggests the emergence of a "renminbi bloc."
Estimated Weights in Currency Baskets
Th e opacity of national exchange rate regimes in East Asia has spawned a cottage industry of international economists who estimate the weights of major currencies in the targeting practices of these monetary authorities. Frankel and Wei (1994) are credited with initiating a series of studies, followed by McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) , Frankel and Wei (2007) , Shu (2010) , and Frankel and Xie (2010) , among a number of others.
2 Th ese studies fi rst identifi ed a strong weight for the US dollar and attempted to track changes in the weight over time. But not until a substantial period had elapsed, during which the Chinese 2. Including, Shu, Chow, and Chan 2007; Ito 2008; Volz 2010 (chapter 7, annex Th ai baht. A 1 percent appreciation of the Japanese yen, for example, was associated with a 0.204 percent appreciation of the Singapore dollar. Th e proportion of the variation that is explained by the movements of these three currencies diff ers substantially from one Asian currency to the next, however. Table 2 , which covers the period of the fi rst managed fl oat of the Chinese currency, introduces the renminbi into the model as a regressor and reports substantial and statistically signifi cant weights in the implicit baskets of the Malaysian ringgit, Singapore dollar, and New Taiwan dollar. Th e weights for the US dollar have fallen substantially in each case. Table 3 table 4 reports weights on the renminbi that are higher than the previous renminbi fl oat for the ringgit, peso, and the baht, similar for the New Taiwan dollar, and somewhat lower for the Singapore dollar. Th e Korean won also shows a stronger weight on the renminbi.
Th e rupiah, in contrast to the other currencies and its own movement during 2005-09, has recently followed the movements of the US dollar fairly closely.
Several overall points can be distilled from these fi ndings. First, the weight of the dollar in these implicit baskets is broadly declining, while that of the renminbi is increasing. Second, the weight of the 6 renminbi in the baskets for four of the main Southeast Asian currencies plus the New Taiwan dollar now appears to be greater than the weight of the US currency. Th ird, the Indonesian rupiah exhibits much more independence from both currencies than do the currencies of its regional neighbors. Fourth, these fi ndings are consistent with the cumulative change in the bilateral nominal exchange rates against the renminbi and dollar since July 2005.
Consider a couple of alternative interpretations of these results. One objection might be that, given these countries' interdependence in "Factory Asia," we would expect their currencies to move together in response to common shocks (such as demand for their exports in the United States and Europe and movements of oil prices). Co-movement of the exchange rate, in this view, is no more collusive than the co-movement of the US and Canadian dollars. Th is comparison is misplaced for two reasons, however. Asian countries have not given up pegged exchange rates; they have instead switched from pegging to the US dollar to pegging to baskets that weight regional currencies fairly heavily. However, these countries might simply be splitting the diff erence in the divergent movements of the US dollar, renminbi, and yen.
It would not be plausible to suggest that these authorities are literally targeting the ACU, as it is an index in the minds of exchange rate analysts with no offi cial standing. Asian countries might achieve more stability in their eff ective exchange rates by targeting the ACU than by targeting the major currencies-a signifi cant fi nding-but the prospect of Asian authorities adopting the ACU as a common basket for soft pegging is at best uncertain.
In summary, Southeast Asian currencies have tended to shadow the renminbi during its period of undervaluation against the dollar and show an increasing tendency to move with the renminbi as the Chinese currency appreciates gradually against the dollar. While the Japanese yen and Korean won exhibit more independent fl oating, the main Southeast Asian currencies appear, tentatively, to be participating in a "renminbi bloc," with the won tracking the renminbi as well since the globlal fi nancial crisis. Th is observation highlights a signifi cant paradox: Southeast Asian monetary authorities are doing so while at the same time the role of the US dollar as an international currency in other respects within the region remains robust. Th e next section addresses possible explanations for this paradox.
SECTION THREE: POWER AND AGENCY
Scholarship in IPE often speaks of "three faces" of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974; Cohen and Chiu, forthcoming) . What light does East Asian currency experience shed on power analysis and the fashion in which International Political Economy (IPE) theorists conceptualize power and agency? Th is section compares the explanatory value of structural power and domestic political economy analysis.
Structural Power
Th e introduction to this volume reviews what have been dubbed by previous analysts as the "three faces"
of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, Lukes 1974) . International monetary aff airs might seem to be a natural realm for "second face" conceptions of power or "structural power," as Susan Strange (1986 Strange ( , 1988 described this concept. She developed her concept, after all, when analyzing the international monetary system. Several of her successors have sought to formulate the concept more rigorously (see, for example, Guzzini 1993 , Palan 1999 . Eric Helleiner (2006) honed the concept specifi cally for international monetary relations and Helleiner (2009) and Kirshner (2009) drew upon it when addressing the international role of the dollar. Given the rise of Asia, therefore, currency relations within the region would seem to be a "crucial case" for this approach to power analysis: If structural approaches are useful, we would expect them to be useful here.
Structural power was famously, if recursively, defi ned by Strange as:
Th e power to shape and determine the structure of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, and their economic enterprises, and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate; structural power, in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises. (Strange 1988, 24-25; quoted in Helleiner 2006, 74) Helleiner (2006, 75) points out that Strange intended to develop a concept of power as control over structures instead of control over other states directly. Cohen (1977, 54-56) defi ned structural power as "the ability to gain by rewriting the rules of the game." In these formulations, power can be exercised either intentionally or unintentionally.
Th e approach has been criticized for a paucity of testable propositions, in the absence of which it has not produced a research program that could be fairly described as cumulative. Precisely what capabilities enable a state to change or sustain the rules of the game? Exactly which rules are important? Re-specifying the structural power approach as a causal theory and fashioning falsifi able hypotheses would be a 8 substantial contribution to power analysis. However, the question naturally arises as to whether this can in fact be done. Strange herself eschewed formulations of structural power that could be formally tested (Palan 1999 , Keohane 2000 .
Economists have described the incentives that the international monetary system applies to exchange-rate policy choice. Th e network externalities associated with the international role of the dollar creates compelling incentives to perpetuate the dollar standard in East Asia. Asian trade, including intraregional trade, is dominated by the US dollar. Chinese and Southeast Asian exporters would face a commercial disadvantage if they demanded invoicing in local currency. Governments and fi rms in the region often cannot borrow in local currency either ("original sin"), or of course lend in it yet ("confl icted virtue"). As a consequence, so the argument goes, they must also weigh the dollar heavily in exchange rate policy and accumulate dollar reserves-at least, doing otherwise would be costly (Dooley, FolkertsLandau, and Garber 2003; McKinnon 2005 and 2013) . Moreover, countries accumulating reserves for precautionary reasons would want to hold the currency for which exchange convenience is greatest in a fi nancial crisis or liquidity squeeze, the US dollar.
But we should disaggregate these arguments and the eff ects of currency use on exchange rate regime Why would these states accept these costs, with active participation and evident enthusiasm? A "structural" or "second face" explanation does not appear well suited to answering this question for two basic reasons. First, in the original formulation of the structural approach, the international role of the dollar eased constraints on the fi nancing of current account defi cits and thus macroeconomic policy of the issuer. Th e experience in Asia over the last decade turned this argument on its head: Foreign exchange intervention by China and other countries led to unprecedentedly large offi cial investments into US Treasury, government-sponsored corporations (GSCs) and even corporate securities, and sustained the role of the dollar. Th ese infl ows were no doubt welcomed by many fi rms and perhaps some sectors in the United States. But they compromised the ability of the Federal Reserve to infl uence long-term interest rates and helped to fuel the fi nancial market and real estate bubble prior to the 2008 crisis (Bergsten and Gagnon 2012) . Senior US offi cials repeatedly pressed Chinese offi cials to reduce their purchases and allow the renminbi to appreciate faster. Rather than conferring an "exorbitant privilege" on the United
States, allowing the United States to exploit others through "rules of the game" that it had written, the international role of the dollar made the country vulnerable to free-riding and even abuse of those rules (Goldstein 2006 ).
Second, the structural power approach does not account for change in exchange rate regimes: As presently formulated, these approaches predict continuity. Strange originally developed and applied the concept to explain the perpetuation of the international role of the dollar, after all, and the ability of the United States to operate relatively unconstrained policies in the post-Bretton Woods environment despite (premature forecasts of ) hegemonic decline. Th is approach cannot explain the shift from soft-pegging to the dollar to shadow-pegging to the renminbi within the context of the continued dominance of the dollar as an international currency in East Asia.
Domestic Politics and Preferences
Rather than driven by structural power inherent in the international monetary system and role of the US currency, the exchange rate regime choices of East Asian states and the shift in these choices over the past decade are better interpreted as a refl ection of preferences and the growing importance of China in the East Asian economy. Th ose preferences are in turn established by domestic political economy: the political dominance of the traded goods industry, especially in China, and widespread internal fi nancial repression in East Asian countries (Henning and Katada 2012) . For East Asian states, accumulating dollar assets and maintaining low-valued currencies served the twin purposes, respectively, of intermediating investment in external assets and maintaining export growth.
For Southeast Asian states, these eff ects were reinforced by competition with China over trade and foreign direct investment. Th e spectacular economic growth of China, its importance within "Factory Asia" and its competitiveness as a trading partner and as a magnet for foreign direct investment made giving greater weight to the renminbi in their currency policy a natural response on the part of Southeast Asian monetary authorities.
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Exchange rate cooperation has been pronounced in East Asia-fi rst when maintaining low levels of valuation against the dollar and then when appreciating jointly-but has taken a highly informal, non-institutionalized form. Moreover, the widespread use of the US dollar as an international currency has been integral to Asian countries' ability to coordinate by adjusting rates in this way. Specifi cally, the dollar provided a common point of reference, a focal point for coordination, and circumvented Sino-Japanese rivalry that would have blocked collective decisions on joint pegging to a common basket (Henning and Katada forthcoming) . China might anticipate the response of Southeast Asian countries when choosing its exchange rate against the US dollar, but the weight given to this consideration is unknown and would seem to be dominated by Chinese and American economic factors.
SECTION FOUR: CHINESE STRUCTURAL POWER?
If the convergence of Southeast Asian currencies on the renminbi exchange rate is not a manifestation of US structural power, could it be the work of Chinese structural power? Th is paper has already argued that China's economic growth has contributed to the shift in the weight of the renminbi in the currency baskets of Southeast Asian countries. China's spectacular growth in general gives Beijing more resources with which to infl uence the policies of others within the region and beyond, both directly and indirectly through markets, when and if Chinese authorities choose to use them (treatments of monetary power and the rise of China include Kirshner 2003 , Andrews 2006 , Grimes 2009 , Subramanian 2011 and Chiu forthcoming; on the renminbi's impact on exports of other countries, see, Mattoo, Mishra, and Subramanian 2012) . Some might suggest, therefore, that a structural-power interpretation is apt: Chinese growth would appear to create a structure of incentives that guides Southeast Asian monetary authorities to shift currency practices. In this perspective, Chinese authorities would not need to manipulate these incentives deliberately for us to recognize that this form of power is at work.
However, analysts of power confront a choice between placing factors such as the growth of China into a conceptual basket labeled "power" and one labeled "preference determination." I believe that the fi eld is better served-in terms of formulating a testable hypothesis on which cumulative research can be based-by analyzing these eff ects through the lens of preferences. Structural power arguments come up short when applied to China, just as when applied to the United States, for four empirical and conceptual reasons.
With respect to the analytical approach, fi rst of all, the increase in the economic size of Th ird, as discussed in the previous section, coordination and stabilization within the renminbi bloc relies on the intermediating role of the US dollar. Th e pattern of exchange rate policies that we witness in East Asia would be far more diffi cult, if not impossible, to achieve in the absence of the prevalent role of the US currency. Th is creates a glaring logical confl ict with earlier formulations of structural power of the United States in international monetary aff airs, such as those championed by Strange, in which the role of the dollar, international capital mobility, and dominance of American fi nancial intermediaries would be expected to strongly favor the United States.
Th e fourth objection relates to intentionality and agency. If an eff ect of globalization cannot be manipulated and is not intended, then it does not seem to be usefully characterized as "US structural power" or "Chinese structural power." It is rather a set of incentives and disincentives that inhere in the pattern of international economic interdependence within the international trade and fi nancial system that are disembodied from individual states. Both the United States and China can suff er as well as profi t from, for example, international capital mobility. Th ese forces are important to shaping policy, but attributing ownership to a particular country would suggest that they somehow serve it in a consistent manner, which is not the case here.
We should indeed be mindful of the patterns of incentives conferred by globalization and economic interdependence. But we must be careful how we conceptualize them. My conceptualization of the "exchange rate weapon" revolves specifi cally around the incentives for policy adjustment created, for example, by a currency appreciation in the face of international confl ict over macroeconomic policies (Henning 1998 and . In the cases cited in that work, international capital fl ows and the operation of the foreign exchange market are harnessed directly to the objectives of the United States, and are under at least partial control of US authorities, and underlying preferences are specifi ed separately from these incentives. 4 Th e latter-the independent specifi cation of preferences-is particularly important.
SECTION FIVE: PREFERENCES IN POWER ANALYSIS
Debates about power in East Asian currency relations serve to remind political scientists of a general principle: We cannot analyze power in isolation from actors' preferences and should always specify them when examining it. Analysts sometimes overlook this step in the rush to identify the sources of power and the channels through which it operates. Unless we can fi rst identify states' preferences, however, we cannot know whether "A induces B to do something that B would not otherwise do." Knowing what B
would do in the absence of any infl uence attempt by A, as set by its preferences, is a necessary precursor.
More fundamentally, if preferences are not in at least partial confl ict, then power analysis is not particularly relevant. Th us, establishing preferences is analytically prior to invoking power and the two, preferences and power, should be used in conjunction. Moravcsik (1997 and advocates such a two-step sequence in building multi-causal explanations. Confusion in the contemporary Asian discourse about whether or not China freely chose its exchange rate regime in the 2000s highlights the importance of pinning down preferences fi rst.
Specifying state preferences is not always easy, of course. States are not unitary actors, constituent social groups have diff erentiated preferences, and policy is naturally contested. A full explanation must describe how some interests dominate others in the internal aggregation process, as well as how external factors impact the interests of domestic groups. Fortunately, domestic and comparative politics provide a number of models for doing so, including social-identity, institutional, rent-seeking, and open economy paradigms. It is better to take advantage of them in a two-stage process rather than attempting to shoehorn preferences and power together into a single analysis.
4. In their important article on the "second face" of hegemony, James and Lake (1989, 4) argue that Britain's repealing the Corn Laws in the middle of the nineteenth century created incentives for the United States to liberalize trade as well. Stolper-Samuelson eff ects swung the position of Western states behind tariff reduction over the course of the 1840s. In their conception, "Th is is a 'Trojan horse' strategy in which the hegemon changes the constellation of interests and political power within other countries in ways more favorable to its own interests." As elegant as it is, however, their interpretation leaves open the possibility that Britain's own interests are decided by the same potential gains off ered by the international prices of tradable goods as operate on the US position on trade policy-which blurs a line between preferences and infl uence that should be kept as clean as possible-and they are ultimately agnostic with respect to the deliberateness with which British authorities target US policy with these eff ects.
As a corollary to the notion that preferences are analytically prior to power analysis, it is critical to keep preferences and power conceptually distinct. If they are confl ated, we cannot examine the independent impact of either on the other or on third variables. In this connection, consider "soft power."
Joseph S. Nye named the concept in order to draw attention to the importance of non-tangible factors infl uencing interstate relations: "Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others to want what you want" (Nye 2008, 29) . Nye (2010 Nye ( , 2011 takes this one step further by introducing "smart power," the use of hard and soft power in combination.
Th e problem with these concepts is that they obliterate the distinction between power and preferences. Although they contribute to policy debates, soft power and smart power thus subvert positive power analysis, albeit unintentionally. Rather than conceiving of soft power as a concept that parallels hard power, we could more usefully conceive of soft power as part of the preference formation process.
Th e concept usefully underscores the fact that preference formation is not entirely a domestic process.
External actors, transnational relations, and fl ows of information, norms, and ideas also aff ect state preference formation. As Moravcsik (2008) writes, states are embedded in the globalized economy and transnational society and these contexts shape state preferences. Economic growth, the evolution of trade and capital markets, and technical advances can reshape preferences in ways that are quite separate from infl uence attempts.
How, as analysts, should we assign cross-border economic eff ects to these diff erent concepts of power and preference formation? Whether these external infl uences should be placed in the basket of "power variables" or "preference determination" should rest on two tests: (1) whether the eff ect can be manipulated by external actors, governments in particular, and (2) whether the impact is intentional. If it is not intentional and cannot be manipulated-and certainly if it is not in the interest of the supposedly dominant state-it should not be assigned to the power category but rather to preference formation.
SECTION SIX: CONCLUSION
Th is paper has examined the exchange rate regimes of East Asian countries and assessed the relative value of the structural power and domestic political economy approaches in explaining regime choice. It examined the cumulative changes in exchange rates since the Chinese shift to a controlled appreciation in July 2005 and conducted a formal econometric test of the weights of key currencies in the implicit baskets of East Asian states. It fi nds that four of the larger economies of Southeast Asia have formed a loose but eff ective "renminbi bloc" with China, while Indonesia and Taiwan have followed the US dollar more closely. Th e Japanese yen and Korean won have tended to fl oat relatively independently, with the won tracking the renminbi somewhat more closely since the global fi nancial crisis.
Despite their broad appeal, structural power explanations do not seem to be well-equipped to explain the emergence of this renminbi bloc or the pattern of reserve accumulation and competitive currency valuation witnessed in East Asia. Among other reasons, the "structural" role of the dollar in East Asia is better suited to explaining continuity than the change in exchange rate regimes that we observe in the region. A common narrative within the region about the constraints imposed by the US dollar and the consequent need to escape them in order to achieve macroeconomic and monetary stability, while colorful, is correspondingly misleading.
Instead, the countries of East Asia have chosen their exchange rate regimes freely, according to the preferences determined by domestic political and fi nancial structures and their position in the international trading system. Asian authorities chose highly competitive currency valuations over the expressed opposition of US authorities, not because Asian countries were subject to US hegemony. Th eir behavior is better described as free riding than submission. Th e shift in exchange rate policy on the part of Asian countries away from the dollar and toward renminbi coincides with the economic rise of Currency relations in East Asia illustrate a number of more general points about power analysis.
First, the prior step in power analysis must be to establish the preferences of actors. Without pinning down preferences fi rst, we cannot assess the success of infl uence attempts. Second, some elements of economic transformation are better conceptualized as part of preference formation than as the exercise of power. Th is paper argues that this is the case for economic growth and exchange rate regimes in East Asia. Th ird, as a corollary, it is essential to keep preferences and power conceptually distinct. Whatever the contributions of some of the concepts of structural power and soft power, they erode this distinction to the detriment of positive analysis.
Th is paper does not argue that power has not been relevant to currency relations in East Asia historically or that it will not be relevant in coming decades. To the contrary, it could well play an important role in regional monetary relations in the future. Nor do I dismiss the importance of power 15 analysis generally. Th e paper argues instead that concepts of power that are confi gured separately from preference formation will be more testable and thus serve as a better basis for a cumulative research program. Concepts of power are likely to be more eff ective analytically if we avoid overloading them and we can do so by asking preferences to shoulder a substantial share of the burden of explanation. 
